



the **CENTER** for  
**INTERNET SECURITY**

## **Center for Internet Security SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Benchmark**

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# Table of Contents

Terms of Use.....	5
Introduction.....	8
Applicability.....	8
Root Shell Environment Assumed.....	8
Executing Actions.....	8
Reboot Required.....	8
Vulnerabilities.....	8
Backup Key Files.....	8
Build Considerations.....	9
Software Package Removal.....	9
Software Package Installation.....	10
1 Patches, Packages and Initial Lockdown.....	11
1.1 Apply Latest OS Patches.....	11
1.2 Validate Your System Before Making Changes.....	12
1.3 Configure SSH.....	12
1.4 Enable System Accounting.....	14
1.5 SuSEfirewall2 is active.....	14
1.6 seccheck is active.....	15
1.7 AppArmor is active.....	15
2 Minimize xinetd network services.....	16
2.1 Disable Standard Services.....	16
2.2 Limit access to trusted networks.....	16
2.3 Only Enable telnet If Absolutely Necessary.....	17
2.4 Only Enable FTP If Absolutely Necessary.....	18
2.5 Only Enable rlogin/rsh/rcp If Absolutely Necessary.....	18
2.6 Only Enable TFTP Server if Absolutely Necessary.....	19
2.7 Only Enable IMAP If Absolutely Necessary.....	20
2.8 Only Enable POP If Absolutely Necessary.....	20
3 Minimize boot services.....	22
3.1 Set Daemon umask.....	22
3.2 Disable xinetd, If Possible.....	22
3.3 Disable remote SMTP connections.....	23
3.4 Disable GUI Login If Possible.....	23
3.5 Disable X Font Server If Possible.....	24
3.6 Disable Standard Boot Services.....	24
3.7 Only Enable SMB (Windows File Sharing) and NMB (NetBIOS Message Block) Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	26
3.8 Only Enable NFS Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	26
3.9 Only Enable NFS Client Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	26
3.10 Only Enable NIS Client Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	27
3.11 Only Enable NIS Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	27
3.12 Only Enable RPC Portmap Process If Absolutely Necessary.....	28
3.13 Only Enable ncpfs Script If Absolutely Necessary.....	28
3.14 Only Enable Web Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	28
3.15 Only Enable SNMP Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	29
3.16 Only Enable DNS Server Process If Absolutely Necessary.....	29

3.17 Only Enable SQL services If Absolutely Necessary .....	30
3.18 Only Enable Webmin Processes If Absolutely Necessary.....	30
3.19 Only Enable Squid Cache Server If Absolutely Necessary .....	30
4 Kernel Tuning .....	32
4.1 Network Parameter Modifications .....	32
4.2 Additional Network Parameter Modifications.....	33
5 Logging.....	35
5.1 syslog is active.....	35
5.2 NTP is active.....	35
5.3 System log file permissions.....	36
5.4 Configure remote system logging.....	36
6 File/Directory Permissions/Access .....	38
6.1 Add 'nodev' Option To Appropriate Partitions In /etc/fstab.....	38
6.2 Add 'nosuid' and 'nodev' Option For Removable Media In /etc/fstab .....	38
6.3 Disable User-Mounted Removable File Systems .....	39
6.4 Verify passwd, shadow, and group File Permissions .....	40
6.5 World-Writable Directories Should Have Their Sticky Bit Set .....	40
6.6 Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files .....	40
6.7 Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables .....	41
6.8 Find All Unowned Files.....	41
6.9 Disable USB Devices (AKA Hotplugger).....	42
7 System Access, Authentication, and Authorization .....	43
7.1 Remove .rhosts Support In PAM Configuration Files .....	43
7.2 /etc/ftpusers.....	43
7.3 Prevent X Server From Listening On Port 6000/tcp .....	44
7.4 Restrict at/cron To Authorized Users .....	45
7.5 Restrict Permissions On crontab Files .....	46
7.6 Configure xinetd Access Control .....	46
7.7 Restrict Root Logins To System Console .....	47
7.8 Set LILO/GRUB Password .....	47
7.9 Require Authentication For Single-User Mode .....	48
7.10 Restrict NFS Client Requests To Privileged Ports .....	49
7.11 Only Enable syslog To Accept Messages If Absolutely Necessary.....	50
8 User Accounts and Environment .....	52
8.1 Block System Accounts .....	52
8.2 Verify That There Are No Accounts With Empty Password Fields .....	52
8.3 Set Account Expiration and Password Parameters On Active Accounts .....	53
8.4 Verify No Legacy '+' Entries Exist In passwd, shadow, And group Files .....	54
8.5 Verify That No UID 0 Accounts Exist Other Than Root .....	54
8.6 No '.' or Group/World-Writable Directory In Root's \$PATH .....	54
8.7 User Home Directories Should Be Mode 750 or More Restrictive.....	55
8.8 No User Dot-Files Should Be World-Writable .....	55
8.9 Remove User .netrc Files.....	56
8.10 Set Default umask For Users .....	56
8.11 Disable Core Dumps .....	58
8.12 Limit Access To The Root Account From su .....	58
8.13 Reboot.....	59

9	Warning Banners.....	60
9.1	Create Warnings For Network And Physical Access Services.....	60
9.2	Create Warnings For GUI-Based Logins.....	62
9.3	Create "authorized only" Banners For vsftpd, If Applicable.....	64
10	Anti-Virus Consideration.....	65
10.1	Anti-Virus Products.....	65
11	Remove Backup Files.....	66
11.1	Remove Backup Files.....	66
12	Additional Security Notes.....	67
12.1	Create Symlinks For Dangerous Files.....	67
12.2	Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection.....	67
12.3	Additional LILO/GRUB Security.....	68
12.4	Evaluate Packages Associated With Startup Scripts.....	68
12.5	Evaluate Every Installed Package.....	69
12.6	Configure sudo.....	70
12.7	Additional Kernel Tunings.....	70
12.8	Remove All Compilers and Assemblers.....	71
Appendix A:	File Backup Script.....	72
Appendix B:	Change History.....	74

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## Introduction

### Applicability

This benchmark was developed and tested on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES) 10 SP1. It is likely to work for other versions of SUSE Linux as well (such as openSUSE). The scoring tool may yield inaccurate results on non-SUSE systems.

### Root Shell Environment Assumed

The actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed by the root user running the bash shell and without noclobber set. Also, the following directories are assumed to be in root's path:

```
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
```

### Executing Actions

The actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed in the order presented here. Some actions may need to be modified if the order is changed. Actions are written so that they may be copied directly from this document into a root shell window with a "cut-and-paste" operation. You may find that many of the "chkconfig" actions, which activate or deactivate services, produce the message "<service name>: unknown service" These messages are quite normal and should not cause alarm – they simply indicate that the program being referenced was not installed on your machine. As SUSE Linux installs allow a great deal of flexibility in what software you choose to install, these messages are unavoidable.

### Reboot Required

Rebooting the system is required after completing all of the actions below in order to complete the re-configuration of the system. In many cases, the changes made in the steps below will not take effect until this reboot is performed. If substantial operating system updates are performed after the initial OS load, you may have to reboot more than once.

### Vulnerabilities

In addition to any specific issues presented by a particular service or protocol, *every* service has the potential of being an entry point into a system if a vulnerability is found. This is why we recommend that some services are disabled even though there is no clear way to exploit them, and there has never been a problem with the service. If you are running an un-needed service, you could have a problem if a hole is found.

### Backup Key Files

Before performing the steps of this benchmark it is strongly recommended that administrators make backup copies of critical configuration files that may get modified by various benchmark items. If this step is not performed, then the site may have no reasonable back-out strategy for reversing system modifications made as a result of this document. The script provided in Appendix B of this document will automatically back up all files that may be modified by the actions below. Note that an executable copy of this script is also provided in the archive containing the PDF version of this document and the



CIS scoring tool. Assuming the administrator is in the directory where the archive has been unpacked, the command to execute the backup script would be:

```
./do-backup.sh
```

One of the byproducts of the do-backup.sh script is /root/do-restore.sh, which is dynamically generated based on the results of the do-backup.sh script. To roll back the changes performed by this benchmark, first run RevertBastille followed by do-restore.sh, and all changes will be backed out. Since not all Linux installations are identical, the do-restore.sh script is created based on the files that actually existed at the time do-backup.sh was run.

Note: If you make any changes manually to any of the files that were preserved by do-backup.sh, those changes will be lost when do-restore.sh is executed. It may be prudent to delete the do-restore.sh script once you have validated the changes to prevent inadvertently undoing the changes.

## Build Considerations

If you have not done so already, plan out a partitioned hard drive. The default partitioning for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server is a single file system. It is preferable to use a setup similar to the following:

```
/ 1 GB
```

```
swap 1xRAM
```

```
/var 1 GB
```

```
/usr 4 GB
```

```
/opt 4 GB
```

```
/home remaining disk space
```

It is important to keep /var and /home on their own partitions. Some applications have a tendency to crash when the / or /usr filesystem reaches 100%. This could happen if users were to store considerable amounts of data (developers storing jar files or copies of application logs, for example) or logs were to fill up their partition. Some Enterprises define a /logs partition and store application logs there.

For additional security, an additional and separate partition may be created for /boot which creates the kernel binaries and boot loader configuration. A /boot partition may be mounted read-only to avoid accidental damage and to make malicious changes a little bit more difficult (e.g. less space for backdoors in malicious kernel patches). A read-only /boot partition however will require special procedures for a valid kernel patch (or update).

To limit the inconveniences caused by filling up /home, consider implementing user and group quotas on the /home filesystem. Quotas will limit how much a single user (or single group) can store on a given filesystem. More information is available in the SUSE Linux manuals (see the installation CDs).

## Software Package Removal

There is considerable debate over the maintenance of unused software packages. Some people feel that as long as the software is not being used, leaving it installed poses no appreciable risk. Others

feel that unused software presents another attack vector and increases the maintenance effort for the administrators. This Benchmark makes no recommendation for the removal of unused software. If vulnerable software is present on a system, that vulnerability may be exploitable by a local attacker, and the reader is advised to consider the effort in either its removal or maintenance and the risks thereof.

## **Software Package Installation**

Throughout this Benchmark, you may be directed to enable software package init scripts using the `chkconfig` command. This assumes you already installed said package(s). If the `chkconfig` command fails, verify you actually installed the software required.

# 1 Patches, Packages and Initial Lockdown

## 1.1 Apply Latest OS Patches

### **Description:**

Developing a procedure for keeping up-to-date with vendor patches is critical for the security and reliability of the system. Vendors issue operating system updates when they become aware of security vulnerabilities and other serious functionality issues, but it is up to their customers to actually download and install these patches.

When Novell publishes an update for SUSE Linux, they include the procedures with it for updating the package. This usually entails downloading the new RPMs from Novell, and making them available to the individual servers. Some Enterprises make these packages available over an NFS share or an internal anonymous FTP/HTTP server – your Enterprise may follow this practice or do something different.

It is also important to observe that your applications work properly after patching. Though problems in patches are quite rare in SUSE Linux, it is generally recommended that any patch be deployed to a non-production system first for testing.

Some RPMs may need to be installed before others. For the most part, RPM understands and solves dependencies. Novell creates separate instructions for special cases, like the replacement of the kernel or the general C library glibc. You may need to examine the list of updates that you have downloaded to check for any of these cases.

Finally, there is some risk to using a non-patched, non-hardened machine to download the patches, as this involves connecting a system with security vulnerabilities on a network, which is not an Industry Best Practice. Please consider these issues carefully. One approach is to use a stateful hardware firewall to separate and protect the unpatched system from all other systems. For the purpose of update and installation the hardware firewall should be configured to prevent all inbound connections; as well as packets that aren't part of an established session.

Novell offers at least partially automated patch download and installation via YaST Online Update. In lieu of an existing Enterprise Standard, consider using YaST Online Update whenever Novell announces vulnerabilities. If your Enterprise has several servers, consider installing an update server that can be used in place of the update servers at Novell– the updates will go much faster, you will use much less bandwidth from your ISP, and you will reduce the load on Novell's servers.

If YaST Online Update is used, it should be used on a lab server and the patches validated and the system regression tested before going to live/production systems.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### **Remediation:**

Update system per your Enterprise Update procedures.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.2 Validate Your System Before Making Changes

### **Description:**

Ensuring your system is functioning properly before you make a change is a prudent system administration best practice and will save you hours of aggravation. Applying this Benchmark to a system that already has issues makes troubleshooting very difficult and may lead you to believe the Benchmark is at fault.

Examine the system and application logs (`/var/log`). Key words to look for include, but are not limited to, "error", "warning", "critical", and "alert".

Performing a scan for rootkits is a prudent measure. Some enterprises may also wish to perform further validation on the integrity of the operating system: anti-virus scanning and checking the integrity of system files against a trusted database of file hashes. While this standard does not endorse specific tools, the following are examples of tools used.

Rootkit detection: Chkrootkit, Rootkit Hunter or kstat (for advanced users).

Anti-virus: clamav (freeware) or commercial anti-virus products from Computer Associates, F-Secure, Kaspersky, Sophos, Symantec or Trend Micro.

Trusted hash databases: The NSRL hash database, a database of file hashes from this server, stored on a separate system (e.g. hashes from AIDE, Tripwire, Trusted Computing Base, etc).

Resolve all issues before continuing.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.3 Configure SSH

### **Description:**

OpenSSH is installed by default. OpenSSH is a popular free distribution of the standards-track SSH protocols which has become the standard implementation on Linux distributions. For more information on OpenSSH, see <http://www.openssh.org>.

The settings in this section attempt to ensure safe defaults for both the client and the server. Specifically, both the ssh client and the sshd server are configured to use only SSH protocol 2, as security vulnerabilities have been found in the first SSH protocol. This may cause compatibility issues at sites still using the vulnerable SSH protocol 1 these sites should endeavor to configure all systems to use only SSH protocol 2.

**Warning:** Note that a banner is added in the `sshd_config` file – we will create this banner later and it is discussed in detail in section 9. If you choose not to implement a banner, you will have to remove the reference to `/etc/issue` from `sshd_config` manually. Please read the section on the legal use of banners before deciding to remove it.

## Recommendation Level: 1

### Remediation:

```
unalias cp rm mv
cd /etc/ssh
cp ssh_config ssh_config.tmp
awk '/^#? *Protocol/ { print "Protocol 2"; next };
{ print }' ssh_config.tmp > ssh_config
if [ "`egrep -l ^Protocol ssh_config`" == "" ]; then
echo 'Protocol 2' >> ssh_config
fi
rm ssh_config.tmp
diff ssh_config-preCIS ssh_config
```

Look at `/etc/ssh/ssh_config` to and verify “Protocol 2” is under the “Host \*” entry. If it is not there, edit the file and put “Protocol 2” under the “Host \*” entry.

```
cp sshd_config sshd_config.tmp
awk '/^#? *Protocol/ { print "Protocol 2"; next };
/^#? *X11Forwarding/ \
{ print "X11Forwarding yes"; next };
/^#? *IgnoreRhosts/ \
{ print "IgnoreRhosts yes"; next };
/^#? *HostbasedAuthentication/ \
{ print "HostbasedAuthentication no"; next };
/^#? *PermitRootLogin/ \
{ print "PermitRootLogin no"; next };
/^#? *PermitEmptyPasswords/ \
{ print "PermitEmptyPasswords no"; next };
/^#? *Banner/ \
{ print "Banner /etc/issue.net"; next };
{print}' sshd_config.tmp > sshd_config
rm sshd_config.tmp
diff sshd_config-preCIS sshd_config
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.4 Enable System Accounting

### Description:

System accounting gathers baseline system data (CPU utilization, disk I/O, etc.) every 10 minutes. The data may be accessed with the sar command, or by reviewing the nightly report files named `/var/log/sa/sar*`. Once a normal baseline for the system has been established, unauthorized activity (password crackers and other CPU-intensive jobs, and activity outside of normal usage hours) may be detected due to departures from the normal system performance curve. Note that this data is only archived for one week before being automatically removed by the regular nightly cron job. Administrators may wish to archive the `/var/log/sa/` directory on a regular basis to preserve this data for longer periods.

Note: SLES does not include sysstat by default (unless the full installation is chosen).

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### Remediation:

Install package sysstat.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.5 SuSEfirewall2 is active

### Description:

SuSEfirewall2 is a stateful network packet filter also known as firewall. It is a script that generates iptables rules from configuration stored in the `/etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2` file. SuSEfirewall2 protects from network attacks by rejecting or dropping some unwanted packets that reach your network interface.

SuSEfirewall2 is installed and activated by default. No services are allowed by default. Any services to be allowed, such as SSH, must be specifically enabled. Use YaST Control Center#Security and Users#Firewall to adjust the firewall configuration. Finer configuration control can be exercised by using YaST Control Center#System#/etc/sysconfig editor in the Network/Firewall/SuSEfirewall2 selection, or editing the `/etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2` file directly.

For additional information, see <http://en.opensuse.org/SuSEfirewall2>.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.6 seccheck is active

### Description:

The SuSE Security Checker (package seccheck) is a set of several shellscripts which check the local security of the system on a regular basis and email reports to a designated user (by default, root).

It includes several checks specified by other items within this benchmark.

**Warning:** If the package john is installed, seccheck will use it to evaluate the password strength of accounts during weekly and monthly evaluations. You may notice 100% processor utilization (due to the use of john) during these times.

### Recommendation Level: 1

### Remediation:

Install the seccheck package.

Run `/usr/lib/secchk/security-control.sh`.

Further adjustments can be made with the YaST Control Center#System#/etc/sysconfig editor in the System/Security/Seccheck selection.

Monitor the daily, weekly, and monthly reports generated by the package.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 1.7 AppArmor is active

### Description:

AppArmor provides network application security via mandatory access control for programs, protecting against the exploitation of software flaws and compromised systems.

Use YaST Control Center#Novell AppArmor to adjust the AppArmor configuration.

For additional information, see <http://www.novell.com/linux/security/apparmor/>.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 2 Minimize xinetd network services

### 2.1 Disable Standard Services

#### Description:

SUSE Linux used xinetd, and in a default configuration, all xinetd services are off

On Linux, xinetd has outpaced inetd as the default network superserver.

After enabling SSH, it is possible to nearly do away with all xinetd-based services, since SSH provides both a secure login mechanism and a means of transferring files to and from the system. The action above will disable all standard services in the xinetd configuration.

The rest of the actions in this section give the administrator the option of re-enabling certain services. Rather than disabling and then re-enabling these services, experienced administrators may wish to simply disable only those services that they know are unnecessary for their systems. If there is any doubt, it is better to disable everything, then re-enable the necessary services based on the function of the server.

Note: If you attempt to re-enable a service and get a message like this:

```
unknown service
```

it means that you have not installed the software for that service yet. Install the software package then proceed with the Benchmark.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

#### Remediation:

```
( cd /etc/xinetd.d; for s in *; do chkconfig $s off ; done; )
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 2.2 Limit access to trusted networks

#### Description:

**Question:** *Is there a reason to allow unlimited network access to this server? If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.*

Use the standard system firewall configuration facility (SuSEfirewall2) to define networks to be trusted.

**Recommendation Level:** 1



**Remediation:**

Add trusted networks to the FW\_TRUSTED\_NETS variable in section 10 of the firewall configuration file `/etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2/`. This can be done using the YaST Control Center#System#/etc/sysconfig editor in the Network/Firewall/SuSEfirewall2 selection.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 2.3 Only Enable telnet If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason that requires users to access this system via telnet, rather than the more secure SSH protocol?*

To enable telnet, `chkconfig telnet on`.

telnet uses an unencrypted network protocol, which means data from the login session (such as passwords and all other data transmitted during the session) can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network, and also that the session can be hijacked by outsiders to gain access to the remote system. The freely-available SSH utilities that ship with SUSE Linux (see <http://www.openssh.com/>) provide encrypted network logins and should be used instead.

To aid in the migration to SSH, there is a freely available SSH client for Windows called putty, which is available from Simon Tatham (see <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/>). There are numerous commercially supported SSH clients as well – check to see if your Enterprise already has an Enterprise SSH client.

Some Enterprises are using telnet over SSL, however, the simpler and more standard solution is to use SSH. Configuring telnet over SSL is beyond the scope of a Level 1 Benchmark and will not be addressed here.

It is understood that large Enterprises deeply entrenched in using telnet may take considerable effort in migrating from telnet to ssh, so telnet may have to be enabled. When it can be disabled, simply run `chkconfig telnet off` to turn it off again.

**Recommendation Level:** 1**Remediation:**

```
chkconfig telnet off
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 2.4 Only Enable FTP If Absolutely Necessary

### Description:

**Question:** *Is this machine an (anonymous) FTP server, or is there a mission-critical reason why data must be transferred to and from this system via an ftp server, rather than sftp or scp? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

vsftpd is not installed by default.

```
chkconfig vsftpd on
```

Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured by sniffing the network, and that the FTP session itself can be hijacked by an external attacker. SSH provides two different encrypted file transfer mechanisms – scp and sftp – and should be used instead. Even if FTP is required because the local system is an anonymous FTP server, consider requiring non-anonymous users on the system to transfer files via SSH-based protocols. For further information on restricting FTP access to the system, see section 7.2 below.

Note: Any directory writable by an anonymous FTP server should have its own partition. This helps prevent an FTP server from filling a hard drive used by other services.

To aid in the migration away from FTP, there are a number of freely available scp and sftp client for Windows, such as WinSCP (available from <http://winscp.sourceforge.net/eng/index.php>) for a Graphical interface to putty, and pscp, which is a part of the previously mentioned putty package.

Some Enterprises are using FTP over SSL, however, the simpler and more standard solution is to use SSH. Configuring FTP over SSL is beyond the scope of a Level 1 Benchmark and will not be addressed here.

### Recommendation Level: 1

### Remediation:

```
chkconfig vsftpd off.
```

### Scoring Status: Scorable

### Compliance Mapping: TBD

### Audit: TBD

## 2.5 Only Enable rlogin/rsh/rcp If Absolutely Necessary

### Description:

The r-commands suffer from the same hijacking and sniffing issues as telnet and ftp, and in addition have a number of well-known weaknesses in their authentication scheme. SSH was designed to be a drop-in replacement for these protocols. Given the wide availability of free SSH implementations, it seems unlikely that there is ever a case where these tools cannot be replaced with SSH (again, see <http://www.openssh.com/>).

```
chkconfig rexec on
```

```
chkconfig rlogin on
```

```
chkconfig rsh on
```

If these protocols are left enabled, please also see section 7.1 for additional security-related configuration settings.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
chkconfig rexec off
```

```
chkconfig rlogin off
```

```
chkconfig rsh off
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 2.6 Only Enable TFTP Server if Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is this system a boot server or is there some other mission-critical reason why data must be transferred to and from this system via TFTP? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig tftp on
if [ ! -d "/tftpboot" ] ; then
mkdir -m 0755 /tftpboot && \
chown root:root /tftpboot
fi
```

TFTP is typically used for network booting of diskless workstations, X-terminals, and other similar devices. Routers and other network devices may copy configuration data to remote systems via TFTP for backup. However, unless this system is needed in one of these roles, it is best to leave the TFTP service disabled.

Note: The tftp-server software is not installed by default on SUSE Linux. You will have to install it if you need to use it. After installing it, perform the actions above.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
chkconfig tftp off.
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 2.7 Only Enable IMAP If Absolutely Necessary

### Description:

**Question:** *Is this machine a mail server with a mission-critical reason to use imap to serve mail to remote mail clients? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig cyrus on
```

or

```
chkconfig imap on
```

Remote mail clients (like Eudora, Netscape Mail and Kmail) may retrieve mail from remote mail servers using IMAP, the Internet Message Access Protocol, or POP, the Post Office Protocol. If this system is a mail server that must offer this protocol then either cyrus or imap may be activated. Note: cyrus and imap both provide IMAP and POP services.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### Remediation:

```
chkconfig cyrus off
```

or

```
chkconfig imap off
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 2.8 Only Enable POP If Absolutely Necessary

### Description:

**Question:** *Is this machine a mail server with a mission-critical reason to use pop to serve mail to remote mail clients? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig qpopper on
```

or

```
chkconfig cyrus on
```

Remote mail clients (like Eudora, Netscape Mail and Kmail) may retrieve mail from remote mail servers using IMAP, the Internet Message Access Protocol, or POP, the Post Office Protocol. If this system is a mail server that must offer the POP protocol then either qpopper or cyrus may be activated.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
chkconfig qpopper off
```

or

```
chkconfig cyrus off
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 3 Minimize boot services

### 3.1 Set Daemon umask

#### Description:

system default umask should be set to at least 027 in order to prevent daemon processes (such as the syslog daemon) from creating world-writable files by default. If a particular daemon needs a less restrictive umask, consider editing the daemon startup script to grant that daemon the required umask while maintaining the increased server security posture.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
cd /etc
awk '($1=="umask") { if ($2 < "027") { $2="027"; } }; \
{ print }' rc.status-preCIS > rc.status
if [ `grep -c umask rc.status` -eq 0 ]; then
echo "umask 027" >> rc.status
fi
diff rc.status-preCIS rc.status
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.2 Disable xinetd, If Possible

#### Description:

If the actions in Section 2 of this benchmark resulted in no services being enabled in the inet super daemon /etc/xinetd.d configuration files, then the xinetd service may be disabled completely on this system.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
cd /etc/xinetd.d
if [ `find . -type f | \
xargs awk '($1=="disable" && $3=="no") {print}' \
| wc -l` -eq 0 ]; then
chkconfig xinetd off;rcxinetd stop
fi
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.3 Disable remote SMTP connections

#### Description:

**Question:** *Is this system a mail server – that is, does this machine receive and process email from other hosts?*

Postfix is installed and active by default on SUSE.

If the system must accept remote SMTP connections, enable remote SMTP connections by setting `SMTPD_LISTEN_REMOTE="yes"` in the `/etc/sysconfig/mail` file using YaST Control Center#Network Services#Mail Transfer Agent, Incoming Mail, Accept Remote SMTP connections, or YaST Control Center#System#/etc/sysconfig editor in the Network/Mail/General selection. The SMTP service must also be enabled in the firewall.

Note that if the system is an email server, the administrator is encouraged to search the Web for additional documentation on postfix security issues.

Experienced administrators will understand that a chroot-jailed user or program can still interact with a postfix process listening on the *loopback* interface.

#### Rationale:

Leave the postfix service active and adjust the configuration if the system must act as an MTA.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

If the system need not accept remote SMTP connections, disable remote SMTP connections by setting `SMTPD_LISTEN_REMOTE="no"` in the `/etc/sysconfig/mail` file using YaST Control Center#Network Services#Mail Transfer Agent, Incoming Mail, Accept Remote SMTP connections, or YaST Control Center#System#/etc/sysconfig editor in the Network/Mail/General selection. Remote SMTP connections are not accepted in a default configuration.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.4 Disable GUI Login If Possible

#### Description:

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason to run a GUI login program on this system? If the answer to this question is no, proceed with the actions below.*

This action disables the graphical login, if present, leaving the user to login via SSH or a normal text-based console. If you elect to deactivate the GUI login screen, users can still run X Windows by typing `startx` at the shell prompt. In SUSE Linux, there are two main runlevels that the system runs in. Runlevel 5 boots directly into X Windows, so as to allow graphical login or easy use of specialized X terminals. Otherwise, for normal text-based console login, runlevel 3 is desirable. GUI login is

activated or deactivated by changing this runlevel in /etc/inittab. Again, note that runlevel 3 still allows the user to run X Windows by typing startx at the shell prompt.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

```
sed -e 's/id:5:initdefault:/id:3:initdefault:/' \
< /etc/inittab > /etc/inittab.tmp
cp /etc/inittab.tmp /etc/inittab
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.5 Disable X Font Server If Possible

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason to run X Windows on this system? If the answer to this question is no, proceed with the actions below.*

If you won't be using an X server on this machine, this action will deactivate the font server.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

```
chkconfig xfs off
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.6 Disable Standard Boot Services

**Description:**

Every system daemon that does not have a clear and necessary purpose on the host should be deactivated. This greatly reduces the chances that the machine will be running a vulnerable daemon when the next vulnerability is discovered in its operating system.

SUSE Linux uses a facility called chkconfig to manage all the SysV rc-scripts. chkconfig adds or deletes links in each of the appropriate runlevel directories (/etc/rc.d/rc\*.d) to activate or deactivate each of the rc-scripts.

This process "chkconfig's" all of the rc-scripts off, so that the local administrator can easily reactivate any of these scripts upon discovery of a mission-critical need for one of these services. One could reactivate the daemon script by typing chkconfig daemon on in most cases, which activates it in runlevels 2 through 5. If one of these runlevels is undesirable, like runlevel 2 for the NFS script, or



the script needs to run in one of the other available runlevels, chkconfig takes the argument " level <levels>" where one can explicitly specify runlevels that it should act on.

Note that vendor patches may restore some of the original entries in the startup script directories /etc/rc.d/rc\*.d – it is always a good idea to check these boot directories and remove any scripts that may have been added by the patch installation process. This would be a good time to ensure this check is in your Enterprise OS Upgrade Procedure.

The rest of the actions in this section give the administrator the option of re-enabling certain services – in particular, the services that are disabled in the second loop in the "Action" section above. Rather than disabling and then re-enabling these services, experienced administrators may wish to simply disable only those services that they know are unnecessary for their systems.

The third loop in the "Action" section locks daemon-user accounts related to servers that we examine by setting a lockout password. This will not prevent a given daemon from running as these users – it simply confirms that these users are not available for human login. It also changes the shell to /bin/false for an additional layer of security as long as shell access is not necessary. Bear in mind that some packages (findutils up to version 4.1.20, for example) do not work properly without a shell for the nobody account – be sure you test this thoroughly if you choose to invalidate the daemon shells.

Note: Not all of the scripts listed above will exist on all systems, as this is a superset of the available rc-scripts in the various SUSE distributions. The benchmark's recommended action will register some trivial errors on each distribution version as a result – these are not cause for alarm.

### **Recommendation Level: 1**

#### **Remediation:**

```
for FILE in
Makefile aeventd atd autofs autoyast boot.evms \
boot.multipath boot.sched boot.scsidev chargen \
chargen-udp cups-lpd cups cupsrenice daytime \
daytime-udp echo echo-udp esound evms fam gpm gssd \
idmapd ipmi ipxmount joystick lm_sensors mdadm \
multipathd netstat nfsboot nfsserver nmb openct \
pcscd portmap powerd raw rexec rlogin rpasswd \
rpmconfigcheck rsh rsync rsyncd saslauthd servers \
services skeleton.compat smartd smb smbfs smpppd \
snmpd svcgssd swat systat tftp time time-udp vnc \
vsftpd xfs xinetd ybind ; do
/etc/init.d/$FILE stop
chkconfig $FILE off
done
for USERID in lp apache named mysql; do
usermod -L -s /bin/false $USERID
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### **3.7 Only Enable SMB (Windows File Sharing) and NMB (NetBIOS Message Block) Processes If Absolutely Necessary**

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is this machine sharing files via the Windows file sharing protocols? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig smb on
```

SUSE Linux includes the popular Open Source Samba server for providing file and print services to Windows-based systems. This allows a Unix system to act as a file or print server in on a Windows network, and even act as a Domain Controller (authentication server) to older Windows operating systems. However, if this functionality is not required by the site, the service should be disabled.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### **3.8 Only Enable NFS Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary**

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is this machine an NFS file server? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig nfsserver on
```

NFS is frequently exploited to gain unauthorized access to files and systems. Clearly there is no need to run the NFS server-related daemons on hosts that are not NFS servers. If the system is an NFS server, the administrator should take reasonable precautions when exporting file systems, including restricting NFS access to a specific range of local IP addresses and exporting file systems "read-only" where appropriate. For more information, consult the exports manual page.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### **3.9 Only Enable NFS Client Processes If Absolutely Necessary**

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason why this system must access file systems from remote servers via NFS? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig autofs on
```

Again, unless there is a significant need for this system to acquire data via NFS, administrators should disable NFS-related services. Note that other file transfer schemes (such as rdist via SSH) can often be preferable to NFS for certain applications.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.10 Only Enable NIS Client Processes If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason why this machine must be an NIS client? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig ypbind on
```

Unless this site must use NIS, it should really be avoided. While it can be very useful for transparently scaling the number of workstations, it's not well designed for security. Sun Microsystems is now phasing out NIS+ in favor of LDAP for naming services – NIS and NIS+ are now reaching end of life.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.11 Only Enable NIS Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason why this machine must be an NIS server? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig ypserv on
chkconfig yppasswdd on
```

Unless this site must use NIS, it should be avoided. While it can be very useful for transparently scaling the number of workstations, it is not well designed for security.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.12 Only Enable RPC Portmap Process If Absolutely Necessary

#### Description:

**Question:** *This machine is an NFS client or server? Is this machine an NIS (YP) or NIS+ client or server? Does the machine run a third-party software application which is dependent on RPC support? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig portmap on
```

RPC-based services typically use very weak or non-existent authentication and yet may share very sensitive information. Unless one of the services listed above is required on this machine, best to disable RPC-based tools completely. If there is uncertainty in whether or not a particular third-party application requires RPC services, consult with the application vendor.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.13 Only Enable ncpfs Script If Absolutely Necessary

#### Description:

**Question:** *Is this machine sharing files via the NFS, Novell Netware or Windows file sharing protocols? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig ncpfs on
```

This service is not necessarily installed by default, therefore the above command may fail. If there are no network file sharing protocols being used, one can deactivate the netfs script. This script mounts network drives on the client. Though this is not a persistent daemon and thus not so dangerous, thinning out the /etc/rc.d/rcN.d directories makes the system much easier to audit.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.14 Only Enable Web Server Processes If Absolutely Necessary

#### Description:

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason why this system must run a Web server? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig apache2 on
```

Even if this machine is a web server, the local site may choose not to use the web server provided with SLES in favor of a locally developed and supported Web environment.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.15 Only Enable SNMP Processes If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Are hosts at this site remotely monitored by a tool (e.g., HP OpenView, MRTG, Cricket) that relies on SNMP? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig snmpd on
```

If SNMP is used to monitor the hosts on this network, experts recommend changing the default community string used to access data via SNMP. On SUSE Linux systems, this parameter has already been changed to a reasonably secure setting in the file `/etc/snmpd.conf`.

Note: In a large Enterprise that relied heavily on SNMP, it was discovered during the Linux rollout that SNMP was not a critical service, and not having it enabled increased the security posture of the servers.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.16 Only Enable DNS Server Process If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is this machine a DNS server, or is a local name server needed? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig named on
```

Most of the machines in the organization do not need a DNS server running on the box. Unless this is one of the organization's name servers, or a local caching name server is needed, it is safe to leave inactive.

If this must be left active, please ensure patches are applied in a timely fashion and consider tightening the configuration.

Additionally, consider the use of Access Control Lists (ACL's) in `/etc/named.conf` to limit who can query your name server. For example, Internal name servers should not respond to outside requests. Large Enterprises run multiple name servers so this should not be an issue. However, smaller organizations may not be able to deploy internal and external name servers and should consider this precaution.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.17 Only Enable SQL services If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is this machine an SQL (database) server? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig postgresql on
chkconfig mysql on
```

If this machine does not need to run the mainstream database (SQL) servers Postgres or MySQL, it is safe to deactivate them. If you need to enable them, issue the command (above) for the database that you installed.

Please read the discussion before executing these commands and select the appropriate command.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.18 Only Enable Webmin Processes If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

Not Applicable to SUSE, This section is retained for consistency with the other Linux Benchmarks.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 3.19 Only Enable Squid Cache Server If Absolutely Necessary

**Description:**

**Question:** *Do you use the squid web cache? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.*

```
chkconfig squid on
```

Squid can actually be beneficial to security, as it imposes a proxy between the client and server. On the other hand, if it is not being used, it should be deactivated and removed. This deactivation decreases the risk of system compromise should a security vulnerability later be discovered in Squid. Finally, if your site does use Squid, do configure it carefully. Many Squid caches are badly configured to either allow outsider attackers to probe internal machines through the firewall or to use the cache to hide their true source IP address from their target hosts. Each site should configure Squid to not allow people outside their perimeter to use the cache without authentication of some sort. A better deployment for squid is on a server with no external-facing network interface (unless you are using it for a reverse web proxy, which is a very specific installation, and beyond the scope of this benchmark).

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 4 Kernel Tuning

### 4.1 Network Parameter Modifications

#### Description:

For an explanation of some of these parameters, see `/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt` in your local copy of the kernel source or read the latest from the cross-referencing Linux site: <http://lxr.linux.no/source/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt>.

`tcp_max_syn_backlog` - INTEGER Maximal number of remembered connection requests, which are still did not receive an acknowledgment from connecting client. Default value is 1024 for systems with more than 128Mb of memory, and 128 for low memory machines. If server suffers of overload, try to increase this number.

`accept_source_route` - BOOLEAN Accept packets with SRR option. `conf/all/accept_source_route` must also be set to TRUE to accept packets with SRR option on the interface default TRUE (router) FALSE (host)

`accept_redirects` - BOOLEAN Accept Redirects. Functional default: enabled if local forwarding is disabled. disabled if local forwarding is enabled.

`secure_redirects` - BOOLEAN Accept ICMP redirect messages only for gateways, listed in default gateway list. `secure_redirects` for the interface will be enabled if at least one of `conf/{all,interface}/secure_redirects` is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise default TRUE

`rp_filter` - BOOLEAN 1 - do source validation by reversed path, as specified in RFC1812 Recommended option for single homed hosts and stub network routers. Could cause troubles for complicated (not loop free) networks running a slow unreliable protocol (sort of RIP), or using static routes. 0 - No source validation. `conf/all/rp_filter` must also be set to TRUE to do source validation on the interface Default value is 0. Note that some distributions enable it in startup scripts.

`accept_source_route` - INTEGER Accept source routing (routing extension header).  $\geq 0$ : Accept only routing header type 2.  $<0$ : Do not accept routing header.

`accept_redirects` - BOOLEAN Accept Redirects. Functional default: enabled if local forwarding is disabled. disabled if local forwarding is enabled.

`secure_redirects` - BOOLEAN Accept ICMP redirect messages only for gateways, listed in default gateway list. `secure_redirects` for the interface will be enabled if at least one of `conf/{all,interface}/secure_redirects` is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise default TRUE

`icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts` - BOOLEAN If set non-zero, then the kernel will ignore all ICMP ECHO and TIMESTAMP requests sent to it via broadcast/multicast. Default: 1

See also SN.9 for additional security-related tunings that you may want to consider.

**Recommendation Level: 1**



## Remediation:

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# Following lines added by CISecurity Benchmark sec
4.1
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 4096
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
printf "/etc/sysctl.conf\troot.root\t600\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 4.2 Additional Network Parameter Modifications

### Description:

**Question:** *Is this system going to be used as a firewall or gateway to pass network traffic between different networks? If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.*

For an explanation of some of these parameters, read the latest from the cross-referencing Linux site: <http://lxr.linux.no/source/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt>.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# Following 3 lines added by CISecurity Benchmark sec
4.2
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
printf "/etc/sysctl.conf\troot.root\t600\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 5 Logging

### Description:

The items in this section cover enabling various different forms of system logging in order to keep track of activity on the system.

### 5.1 syslog is active

#### Description:

SUSE Linux uses [syslog-ng](#) for system logging, which is installed by default. The file `/var/log/messages` will contain most messages, with iptables, mail, and news messages sent to separate files (`/var/log/firewall`, `/var/log/mail*`, and `/var/log/news/*` respectively). File permissions are by default set to `u=rw,g=r,o=`.

The syslog-ng reference manual can be found on the local system at `file:///usr/share/doc/packages/syslog-ng/html/book1.html`.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Scoring Status: Scorable

#### Compliance Mapping: TBD

#### Audit: TBD

### 5.2 NTP is active

#### Description:

Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol designed to synchronize the clocks of computers over a network. NTP is installed by default, but not enabled. System clocks should be maintained to a high degree of accuracy so that log records accurately reflect the time of events.

NTP should be enabled (it runs as a service listening on `udp/123`), but should be configured as a client only. The configuration should by default ignore any requests not specifically allowed (restrict default ignore) and allow most operations only from the local loopback (restrict 127.0.0.1), and just allow NTP responses from the servers, so (nomodify notrap noquery nopeer) are all recommend for the NTP servers configured. Finally it's best to configure 3 servers. Sample configs:

```
# Prohibit general access to this service.
restrict default ignore
restrict <ntp_server1> mask 255.255.255.255 nomodify
notrap noquery nopeer
restrict <ntp_server2> mask 255.255.255.255 nomodify
notrap noquery nopeer
restrict <ntp_server3> mask 255.255.255.255 nomodify
notrap noquery nopeer
# Permit all access over the loopback interface. This
could
```

```
# be tightened as well, but to do so would effect
some of
# the administrative functions.
restrict 127.0.0.1
# --- OUR TIMESERVERS -----
server <ntp_server1>
server <ntp_server2>
server <ntp_server3>
```

Additional information on NTP can be found at <http://www.ntp.org> and

[http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/otherformats/html\\_single/TimePrecision-HOWTO.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/otherformats/html_single/TimePrecision-HOWTO.html).

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

Use YaST Control Center#Network Services#NTP Configuration to configure NTP.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 5.3 System log file permissions

**Description:**

Ensure system log file ownership and permissions are correct.

Log file permissions are dictated by the `/etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf.in` file as well as configuration files in `/etc/logrotate.d`.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 5.4 Configure remote system logging

**Description:**

Configure system logging to send logs to a remote logging system in addition to the local system.

**Warning: Accurate system clocks are essential. Use NTP on all systems.**

**Rationale:**

By duplicating log records to a separate system, they are preserved in the event of system failure or compromise. Collection of events from a number of systems allows correlation.

**Recommendation Level: 1****Remediation:**

syslog-ng can log via udp or tcp. Unless continual availability of the remote logging system can be assured, udp should be used (as tcp is a reliable transport and will buffer at the source). Use of udp will cause log records to be sent as they are generated, and of course the intervening network and destination system must be reliable enough to prevent datagram loss.

In the `/etc/syslog-ng.conf.in` file, declare a destination for logging, e.g., `destination remote_loghost {udp("loghost.site");};` (if using udp), or `destination remote_loghost {tcp("loghost.site");};` (if using tcp). This destination can be used in a log directive, e.g., `log { source(src); filter(f_messages); destination(remote_loghost); };`, which duplicates the content that is found in the `/var/log/messages` file in the default configuration.

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable, Not Checked

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 6 File/Directory Permissions/Access

### 6.1 Add 'nodev' Option To Appropriate Partitions In /etc/fstab

#### Description:

Placing "nodev" on these partitions prevents users from mounting unauthorized devices on any partitions that we know should not contain devices. There should be little need to mount devices on any partitions other than /dev.

One notable exception, of course, is the case where system programs are being placed into "chroot jails"- these often require that several devices be created in the chroot directory. If you are using chroot jails on your machines, you should be careful with the nodev option.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
cp -p /etc/fstab /etc/fstab.tmp
awk '($3 ~ /^ext[23]$\|^reiserfs$/ && $2 != "/") \
{ $4 = $4 ",nodev" }; \
{ print }' /etc/fstab.tmp > /etc/fstab
rm -f /etc/fstab.tmp
diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 6.2 Add 'nosuid' and 'nodev' Option For Removable Media In /etc/fstab

#### Description:

Removable media is one vector by which malicious software can be introduced onto the system. By forcing these file systems to be mounted with the nosuid option, the administrator prevents users from bringing set-UID programs onto the system via CDRoms and floppy disks. We also force these filesystems to mount with the nodev option, as explained in item 6.1.

If this machine has multiple CD-ROM or floppy drives, additional action must be taken. Simply add nosuid to the fourth field for the /etc/fstab lines that reference those drives.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

**Remediation:**

```
cp -p /etc/fstab /etc/fstab.tmp
awk '($2 ~ /^\/m.*\/(floppy|cdrom)$/) \
{ $4 = $4 " ,nosuid,nodev" }; \
{ print }' /etc/fstab.tmp > /etc/fstab
rm -f /etc/fstab.tmp
diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

### 6.3 Disable User-Mounted Removable File Systems

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason to allow unprivileged users to mount CD-ROMs and floppy disk file systems on this system? If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.*

In SLES, only the root user can mount removable media such as a floppy or cdrom for use, by default. However if /etc/fstab has been changed to allow user mounting, then this item will remove the risk posed by user mounting.

Allowing users to mount and access data from removable media drives makes it easier for malicious programs and data to be imported onto the network or data to be removed from the server.

This item examines the floppy and cdrom media entries in /etc/fstab and changes the user or users option to nouser (thereby preventing user mounting).

**Recommendation Level:** 1**Remediation:**

```
cp -p /etc/fstab /etc/fstab.tmp
cat /etc/fstab.tmp |
sed 's|\\( /media/[fc].* *subfs .*[ ,]\\)' 'user\\([
,]\\)|\\1nouser\\2|' |
sed 's|\\( /media/[fc].* *subfs .*[ ,]\\)' 'users\\([
,]\\)|\\1nouser\\2|' > /etc/fstab
rm -f /etc/fstab.tmp
diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 6.4 Verify passwd, shadow, and group File Permissions

### Description:

There are the default owners and access permissions for these files. It is worthwhile to periodically check these file permissions as there have been package defects that changed /etc/shadow permissions to 644. Tripwire (<http://www.tripwire.org/downloads/index.php>) and AIDE (<http://sourceforge.net/projects/aide>) – the successor to Tripwire – are excellent products for alerting you to changes in these files. Whereas AIDE is an improvement to the non-commercial version of Tripwire, it is still listed as Beta software, and may not be suitable for Enterprise Production systems.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 6.5 World-Writable Directories Should Have Their Sticky Bit Set

### Description:

Administrators who wish to obtain a list of offending directories may execute the following commands:

```
for PART in `awk '($3 ~ "ext2|ext3|reiserfs") \
{ print $2 }' /etc/fstab`; do
find $PART -xdev -type d \
\(-perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000\) -print
done
```

There should be no entries returned.

When the so-called "sticky bit" is set on a directory, then only the owner of a file may remove that file from the directory (as opposed to the usual behavior where anybody with write access to that directory may remove the file). Setting the sticky bit prevents users from overwriting each other's files, whether accidentally or maliciously, and is generally appropriate for most world-writable directories. However, consult appropriate vendor documentation before blindly applying the sticky bit to any world writable directories found in order to avoid breaking any application dependencies on a given directory.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 6.6 Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files

### Description:



Administrators who wish to obtain a list of the world-writable files currently installed on the system may run the following commands:

```
for PART in `awk '($6 != "0") { print $2 }' /etc/fstab`; do
find $PART -xdev -type f \
\(-perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000\) -print
done
```

There should be no entries returned.

Data in world-writable files can be modified and compromised by any user on the system. World-writable files may also indicate an incorrectly written script or program that could potentially be the cause of a larger compromise to the system's integrity. Generally removing write access for the "other" category (chmod o-w <filename>) is advisable, but always consult relevant vendor documentation in order to avoid breaking any application dependencies on a given file.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 6.7 Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables

### Description:

Administrators who wish to obtain a list of the set-UID and set-GID programs currently installed on the system may run the following commands:

```
for PART in `awk '($6 != "0") { print $2 }' /etc/fstab`; do
find $PART \(-perm -04000 -o -perm -02000\) \
-type f -xdev -print
done
```

The administrator should take care to ensure that no rogue set-UID programs have been introduced into the system. In addition, if possible, the administrator should attempt a Set-UID audit and reduction.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 6.8 Find All Unowned Files

### Description:

```
for PART in `awk '($6 != "0") { print $2 }' /etc/fstab`; do
find $PART -nouser -o -nogroup -print
```

done

There should be no entries returned.

Do not allow any unowned files on your system. Unowned files may be an indication an intruder has accessed your system or improper package maintenance/installation. Sometimes a package removal results in unowned files or directories related to this software as the user/group associated with that package is removed, but that user's files (i.e., files changed after the package was installed) are left behind. Another common cause is the installation of software that does not properly set file ownerships.

Files in any NFS mounts may be ignored as the user ID mapping between systems may be out of sync. If your Enterprise uses a central user management system (NIS or LDAP), the presence of unowned files may indicate another problem and should be investigated.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## **6.9 Disable USB Devices (AKA Hotplugger)**

### **Description:**

Hotplugger cannot be removed without removing xfree86. Removing the X server is beyond the scope of this Benchmark. This section is retained for consistency with the other Linux Benchmarks.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7 System Access, Authentication, and Authorization

### 7.1 Remove .rhosts Support In PAM Configuration Files

#### Description:

Used in conjunction with the BSD-style "r-commands" (rlogin, rsh, rcp), the .rhosts files implement a weak form of authentication based on the network address or host name of the remote computer (which can be spoofed by a potential attacker to exploit the local system). Disabling .rhosts support helps prevent users from subverting the system's normal access control mechanisms.

If .rhosts support is required for some reason, some basic precautions should be taken when creating and managing .rhosts files. Never use the "+" wildcard character in .rhosts files. In fact, .rhosts entries should always specify a specific trusted host name along with the user name of the trusted account on that system (e.g., "trustedhost alice" and not just "trustedhost"). Avoid establishing trust relationships with systems outside of the organization's security perimeter and/or systems not controlled by the local administrative staff. Firewalls and other network security elements should actually block rlogin/rsh/rcp access from external hosts.

Finally, make sure that .rhosts files are only readable by the owner of the file (i.e., these files should be mode 600).

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
for FILE in /etc/pam.d/*; do
grep -v rhosts_auth $FILE > ${FILE}.tmp
mv -f ${FILE}.tmp $FILE
chown root:root $FILE
chmod 644 $FILE
printf "$FILE \troot.root\t644\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 7.2 /etc/ftpusers

#### Description:

/etc/ftpusers contains a list of users who *are not* allowed to access the system via FTP. Generally, only normal users should ever access the system via FTP - there should be no reason for "system" type accounts to be transferring information via this mechanism. Certainly the root account should never be allowed to transfer files directly via FTP.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

None - SUSE provides this file by default in the netcfg package, pre-populated with reasonable content.

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

**7.3 Prevent X Server From Listening On Port 6000/tcp****Description:**

X servers listen on port 6000/tcp for messages from remote clients running on other systems. However, X Windows uses a relatively insecure authentication protocol and an attacker who is able to gain unauthorized access to the local X server can easily compromise the system. Invoking the "-nolisten tcp" option causes the X server not to listen on port 6000/tcp by default. This prevents authorized remote X clients from displaying windows on the local system as well. However, the forwarding of X events via SSH will still happen normally. This is the preferred and more secure method transmitting results from remote X clients in any event.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

## Remediation:

```
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/Xservers ]; then
cd /etc/X11/xdm
awk '($1 !~ /^#/ && $3 == "/usr/X11R6/bin/X" \
&& $0 !~ /-nolisten tcp/) \
{ $3 = $3 " -nolisten tcp" }; { print }' \
Xservers-preCIS > Xservers
chown root:root Xservers
chmod 444 Xservers
printf "/etc/X11/xdm/Xservers \troot.root\t444\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff Xservers-preCIS Xservers
fi
```

```
if [ -e /etc/sysconfig/displaymanager ]; then
cd /etc/sysconfig/
cat displaymanager-preCIS |
sed
`s|\(DISPLAYMANAGER_XSERVER_TCP_PORT_6000_OPEN\)'\
\.*.yes.|\1="no"|' > displaymanager
chown root:root displaymanager
chmod 644 displaymanager
printf "/etc/sysconfig/displaymanager
\troot.root\t644\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff displaymanager-preCIS displaymanager
fi
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.4 Restrict at/cron To Authorized Users

### Description:

The cron.allow and at.allow files are a list of users who are allowed to run the crontab and at commands to submit jobs to be run at scheduled intervals. On many systems, only the system administrator needs the ability to schedule jobs. Note that even though a given user is not listed in cron.allow, cron jobs can still be run as that user. cron.allow only controls administrative access to the crontab command for scheduling and modifying cron jobs.

Warning: Do not alter the `/etc/at.allow` or `/etc/cron.allow` files unless you know what you are doing. The supplied files have reasonable default content.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

If `at` and `cron` must be restricted, create `/etc/at.allow` and `/etc/cron.allow` files and add users as appropriate.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.5 Restrict Permissions On crontab Files

**Description:**

The system crontab files are accessed only by the cron daemon (which runs with superuser privileges) and the crontab command (which is set-UID to root). Allowing unprivileged users to read or (even worse) modify system crontab files can create the potential for a local user on the system to gain elevated privileges.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

Maintain the permissions level deemed appropriate and use `chkstat`.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.6 Configure xinetd Access Control

**Description:**

This item configures `xinetd` to use simple IP-based access control and log connections. Just as `xinetd`'s access control mechanisms are used to monitor illicit connection attempts, the popular PortSentry tool (<http://www.pSIONIC.com/products/port Sentry.html>) can be used to monitor access attempts on unused ports. Note that running PortSentry may result in the CIS testing tools reporting "false positives" for "active" ports that are actually being held by the PortSentry daemon. Consider replacing the PortSentry daemon with PSAD, short for Port Scan Attack Detector, available from <http://www.cipherdyne.com/psad/>. Unlike PortSentry, PSAD doesn't have to hold open ports -- instead, it communicates directly with the kernel.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

None: use the system firewall (SuSEfirewall2) instead.

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.7 Restrict Root Logins To System Console

**Description:**

Anonymous root logins should never be allowed, except on the system console in emergency situations. At all other times, the administrator should access the system via an unprivileged account and use some authorized mechanism (such as the su command, or the freely-available sudo package) to gain additional privileges. These mechanisms provide at least some audit trail in the event of problems.

Many Enterprises – who use serial port concentrators to connect to a server in a data center without physically having to use the keyboard – consider the serial port a console. This is in keeping with the Unix server tradition of controlling headless Unix machines using a serial port console. Just like the virtual consoles, this one needs protected as well. If this applies to your organization, you may execute these lines:

```
echo ttyS0 >> /etc/securetty
echo ttyS1 >> /etc/securetty
```

Be advised that doing so will reduce your CIS Scoring Tool score and reduce your security posture.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

```
echo console >> /etc/securetty
chown root:root /etc/securetty
chmod 400 /etc/securetty
printf "/etc/securetty \troot.root\t400\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff /etc/securetty-preCIS /etc/securetty
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.8 Set LILO/GRUB Password

**Description:**

By default on most Linux systems, the boot loader prompt allows an attacker to subvert the normal boot process very easily. The action above will allow the system to boot normally, only requiring a password when the user attempts to modify the boot process by passing commands to LILO or GRUB. Make sure to replace <password> in the actions above with a good password.

### **Recommendation Level: 1**

#### **Remediation:**

Action (if you have an /etc/lilo.conf file):

- 1 Add the following lines to the beginning of /etc/lilo.conf

```
restricted
password=<password>
```

Replace <password> with an appropriate password for your organization.
- 2 Execute the following commands as root:

```
chown root:root /etc/lilo.conf
chmod 600 /etc/lilo.conf
printf "/etc/lilo.conf \troot.root\t600\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
lilo
```

Action (if you have an /etc/grub.conf file):

- 1 Add this line to /etc/grub.conf before the first uncommented line.

```
password <password>
```

Replace <password> with an appropriate password for your organization.
- 2 Execute the following commands as root:

```
chown root:root /etc/grub.conf
chmod 600 /etc/grub.conf
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## **7.9 Require Authentication For Single-User Mode**

### **Description:**

On some Linux systems you can enter single user mode simply by typing "linux single" at the LILO prompt or in the GRUB boot-editing menu. This represents a clear security risk – authentication should always be required for root-level access. It should be noted that it is extremely difficult to prevent compromise by any attacker who has knowledge, tools, and full physical access to a system. This kind of measure simply increases the difficulty of compromise by requiring more of each of these factors.

SUSE Linux prevents this risk, by default, however this item checks for the proper setting and puts it back in place if it is missing.



The last two items have attempted to address concerns of physical/boot security. To make these preparations more complete, one should consider setting the BIOS to boot only from the main hard disk and locking this setting with a BIOS password. For more information on reducing the threat posed by an attacker with physical/boot access, consider the article "Anyone with a Screwdriver Can Break In," available at <http://www.bastille-linux.org/jay/anyone-with-a-screwdriver.html>.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

```
cd /etc
if [ "`grep -l sulogin inittab`" = "" ]; then
awk '{ print }; /^id:[0123456sS]:initdefault:/ \
{ print "~~:S:respawn:/sbin/sulogin" }' \
inittab > inittab.tmp
cp inittab.tmp inittab
rm inittab.tmp
fi
diff inittab-preCIS inittab
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.10 Restrict NFS Client Requests To Privileged Ports

**Description:**

Setting the secure parameter causes the NFS server process on the local system to ignore NFS client requests that do not originate from the privileged port range (ports less than 1024). This should not hinder normal NFS operations but may block some automated NFS attacks that are run by unprivileged users.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

## Remediation:

Add the secure option to all entries in the `/etc/exports` file. The following Perl code will perform this action automatically.

```
if [ -s /etc/exports ]; then
perl -i.orig -pe \
'next if (/^\s*#/ || /^\s*$/);
($res, @hst) = split(" ");
foreach $ent (@hst) {
undef(%set);
($optlist) = $ent =~ /\((.*?)\)/;
foreach $opt (split(/,/, $optlist)) {
$set{$opt} = 1;
}
delete($set{"insecure"});
$set{"secure"} = 1;
$ent =~ s/\(.*?)//;
$ent .= "(" . join(",", keys(%set)) . ")";
}
$hst[0] = "(secure)" unless (@hst);
$_ = "$res\t" . join(" ", @hst) . "\n";' \
/etc/exports
fi
diff /etc/exports-preCIS /etc/exports
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 7.11 Only Enable syslog To Accept Messages If Absolutely Necessary

### Description:

**Question:** *Is this machine a log server, or does it need to receive syslog messages via the network from other systems? If the answer to this question is yes, then enable syslog-ng to accept remote messages.*

By default the system logging daemon, `syslogd`, does not listen for log messages from other systems on network port 514/udp (Solaris, by contrast, does listen by default).

It is considered good practice to set up one or more machines as central "log servers" to aggregate log traffic from all machines at a site. However, unless a system is set up to be one of these "log server" systems, it should not be listening on 514/udp for incoming log messages as the protocol used to transfer these messages does not include any form of authentication, so a malicious outsider could simply barrage the local system's Syslog port with spurious traffic either as a denial-of- service attack on the system, or to fill up the local system's logging file systems so that subsequent attacks will not be logged.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

Uncomment the line `#udp(ip("0.0.0.0") port(514));` in `syslog-ng.conf.in`.

Adjust the SUSEfirewall2 configuration to allow inbound syslog packets.

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable, Not Checked

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8 User Accounts and Environment

### 8.1 Block System Accounts

#### Description:

These accounts are non-human system accounts that should be made less useful to an attacker by locking them and setting the shell to a shell not in /etc/shells. They can even be deleted if the machine does not use the daemon/service that each is responsible for, though it is safest to simply deactivate them as is done here. To deactivate them, lock the password and set the login shell to an invalid shell. /bin/false is a good choice—it is a valid executable that is not a valid login shell. /bin/false is the choice used by Novell for SUSE Linux instead of /dev/null or /bin/nologin.

This section expands upon section 3.6 for locking out users.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
for NAME in `cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd`; do
  MyUID=`id -u $NAME`
  if [ $MyUID -lt 500 -a $NAME != 'root' ]; then
    usermod -L -s /bin/false $NAME
  fi
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 8.2 Verify That There Are No Accounts With Empty Password Fields

#### Description:

The command `awk -F: '($2 == "") { print $1 }' /etc/shadow` should return no lines of output.

An account with an empty password field means that anybody may log in as that user without providing a password at all. All accounts should have strong passwords or should be locked by using a password string like "NP" or "\*LOCKED\*".

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.3 Set Account Expiration and Password Parameters On Active Accounts

### Description:

It is a good idea to force users to change passwords on a regular basis. These commands will set all active accounts (except system accounts) to force password changes every 90 days (-M 90), and then prevent password changes for seven days (-m 7) thereafter. Users will begin receiving warnings 28 days (-W 28) before their password expires. Once the password expired, the account will be locked out after 7 days (-I 7). Finally, the instructions above set a minimum password length of 6 characters.

These are recommended starting values. Some regulated industries require more restrictive values – ensure they comply with your Enterprise security policy.

### Recommendation Level: 1

### Remediation:

```
cd /etc
cp login.defs login.defs.tmp
if [ `grep -c "^PASS_MIN_LEN" login.defs` -eq 0 ];
then
echo "PASS_MIN_LEN 6" > login.defs.tmp
fi
```

```
awk '($1 ~ /^PASS_MAX_DAYS/) { $2="90" }
($1 ~ /^PASS_MIN_DAYS/) { $2="7" }
($1 ~ /^PASS_WARN_AGE/) { $2="28" }
($1 ~ /^PASS_MIN_LEN/) { $2="6" }
($1 ~ /^LOGIN_RETRIES/) { $2="3" }
{ print } ' login.defs.tmp > login.defs
```

```
chown root:root login.defs
chmod 640 login.defs
printf "/etc/login.defs \troot.root\t640\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
rm login.defs.tmp
diff login.defs-preCIS login.defs
useradd -D -f 7
diff /etc/default/useradd-preCIS /etc/default/useradd
for NAME in `cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd`; do
uid=`id -u $NAME`
if [ $uid -ge 500 -a $uid != 65534 ]; then
chage -m 7 -M 90 -W 28 -I 7 $NAME
fi
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.4 Verify No Legacy '+' Entries Exist In passwd, shadow, And group Files

### Description:

The command `grep ^+: /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /etc/group` should return no lines of output.

'+' entries in various files used to be markers for systems to insert data from NIS maps at a certain point in a system configuration file. These entries may provide an avenue for attackers to gain privileged access on the system, and should be deleted if they exist.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### Remediation:

Remove any such entries.

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.5 Verify That No UID 0 Accounts Exist Other Than Root

### Description:

The command `awk -F: '($3 == 0) { print $1 }' /etc/passwd` should return only the word "root".

Any account with UID 0 has superuser privileges on the system. The only superuser account on the machine should be the root account, and it should be accessed by logging in as an unprivileged user and using the `su` command (or equivalent) to gain additional privilege.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.6 No '.' or Group/World-Writable Directory In Root's \$PATH

### Description:

To find '.' in \$PATH:

```
echo $PATH | egrep '(^|:)(\.|:|$)'
```

To find group- or world-writable directories in \$PATH:

```
find `echo $PATH | tr ':' ' '` -type d \  
\( -perm -002 -o -perm -020 \) -ls
```

These commands should produce no output.

Including the current working directory (.) or other writable directory in root's executable path makes it likely that an attacker can gain superuser access by forcing an administrator operating as root to execute a Trojan horse program.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.7 User Home Directories Should Be Mode 750 or More Restrictive

### Description:

Group or world-writable user home directories may enable malicious users to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system privileges. Disabling "read" and "execute" access for users who are not members of the same group (the "other" access category) allows for appropriate use of discretionary access control by each user. While the above modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### Remediation:

```
for DIR in \  
`awk -F: '($3 >= 500) { print $6 }' /etc/passwd`; do  
  chmod g-w $DIR  
  chmod o-rwx $DIR  
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.8 No User Dot-Files Should Be World-Writable

### Description:

World-writable user configuration files may enable malicious users to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system privileges. While the above modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
for DIR in \  
`awk -F: '($3 >= 500) { print $6 }' /etc/passwd`; do  
for FILE in $DIR/[A-Za-z0-9]*; do  
if [ ! -h "$FILE" -a -f "$FILE" ]; then  
chmod go-w "$FILE"  
fi  
done  
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 8.9 Remove User .netrc Files

**Description:**

```
find / -name .netrc
```

*Stop!!! Read the discussion before proceeding.*

.netrc files may contain unencrypted passwords which may be used to attack other systems. While the above modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users. If the first command returns any results, carefully evaluate the ramifications of removing those files before executing the remaining commands as you may end up impacting an application that has not had time to revise its architecture to a more secure design.

**Recommendation Level:** 1**Remediation:**

```
for DIR in `cut -f6 -d: /etc/passwd`; do  
if [ -e $DIR/.netrc ]; then  
echo "Removing $DIR/.netrc"  
rm -f $DIR/.netrc  
fi  
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 8.10 Set Default umask For Users

**Description:**



With a default umask setting of 077 – a setting agreed to as part of the consensus process with DISA and NSA – files and directories created by users will not be readable by any other user on the system. The user creating the file has the discretion of making their files and directories readable by others via the chmod command. Users who wish to allow their files and directories to be readable by others by default may choose a different default umask by inserting the umask command into the standard shell configuration files (.profile, .cshrc, etc.) in their home directories. A umask of 027 would make files and directories readable by users in the same Unix group, while a umask of 022 would make files readable by every user on the system.

We adjust root's umask setting separately in this item, as root shells don't necessarily read the system-wide configuration files. For example, root sessions using bash doesn't get umask settings from /etc/profile.

Note: This has been shown to cause problems with the installation of software packages where the installation script uses the default umask – the directories are owned by root with 700 permissions, and then the application and/or daemon cannot read its files. A simple fix to this problem is to manually issue a less restrictive umask (such as umask 022) for the shell session doing the installation, or place such a umask command in the beginning to a less restrictive value before the installation, or in the beginning of the installation script.

#### **Recommendation Level: 1**

#### **Remediation:**

```
cd /etc
for FILE in profile csh.login csh.cshrc bash.bashrc;
do
if ! egrep -q 'umask.*77' $FILE ; then
echo "umask 077" >> $FILE
fi
chown root:root $FILE
chmod 444 $FILE
printf "/etc/$FILE \troot.root\t444\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff ${FILE}-preCIS $FILE
done
cd /root
for FILE in .bash_profile .bashrc .cshrc .tcshrc; do
if ! egrep -q 'umask.*77' $FILE ; then
echo "umask 077" >> $FILE # See description
fi
chown root:root $FILE
printf "/root/$FILE \troot.root\t600\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff ${FILE}-preCIS $FILE
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.11 Disable Core Dumps

### Description:

**Question:** *Do you have developers who need to debug crashed programs or send low-level debugging information to software developers/vendors? If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.*

Core dumps can consume large amounts of disk space and may contain sensitive data. On the other hand, developers using this system may require core files in order to aid in debugging. The `limits.conf` file can be used to grant core dump ability to individual users or groups of users.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

### Remediation:

```
cd /etc/security
cat <<END_ENTRIES >> limits.conf
# Following 9 lines added by CISecurity Benchmark sec
8.11
* soft core 0
* hard core 0
END_ENTRIES
diff limits.conf-preCIS limits.conf
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.12 Limit Access To The Root Account From su

### Description:

The `su` command allows you to become other users on the system. This is commonly used to become “root” and execute commands as the super-user. If you do not want certain users to `su` to root then ensure the following line exists in `/etc/pam.d/su`:

```
auth required pam_wheel.so
```

This line allows only the users in the `wheel` group to become root by using the `su` command and entering the root password. All other users will receive a message stating the password is incorrect.

By limiting access to the root account, even if a user knows the root password, they will not be able to become root unless that user has physical access to the server's console, or they are added to the `wheel` group. This adds another layer of security to the system and prevents unauthorized system access.

**Warning:** If you do not have immediate physical access to the server, ensure you have a user in the wheel group before running the below script. Failure to do so will prevent you from using su to become root.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
cd /etc/pam.d/  
if [ `grep -c "^auth *required *pam_wheel.so" su` -eq  
0 ]  
then  
printf "auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid\n"\  
>> su  
fi  
diff /etc/pam.d-preCIS/su su
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 8.13 Reboot

**Description:**

Whenever you make substantial changes to a system, reboot. Some System Administrators believe any change to the init scripts warrant a reboot to ensure the system comes up as expected. Hours of lost productivity with extensive troubleshooting (not to mention lost revenue) have occurred because a system did not start up as expected. The root cause was an init problem that would have been detected had the reboot taken place.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
telinit 6
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## **9 Warning Banners**

### **9.1 Create Warnings For Network And Physical Access Services**

**Description:**

The contents of the `/etc/issue` file are displayed prior to the login prompt on the system's console and serial devices. `/etc/motd` is generally displayed after all successful logins, no matter where the user is logging in from, but is thought to be less useful because it only provides notification to the user after the machine has been accessed.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

## Remediation:

*Important: You need to change "The Organization" in the text below to an appropriate value for your organization*

### 1 Create banners for console access:

```
unalias cp mv
cd /etc
# Remove OS indicators from banners
for FILE in issue issue.net motd; do
cp -f ${FILE} ${FILE}.tmp
egrep -vi "SUSE|kernel" ${FILE}.tmp > ${FILE}
rm -f ${FILE}.tmp
done
# Change name of owner
# Remember to enter name of your company here:
COMPANYNAME="The Organization"
cp -f issue issue.tmp
sed -e "s/its owner/${COMPANYNAME}/g" issue.tmp >
issue
rm -f issue.tmp
diff issue-preCIS issue
if [ "`grep -i authorized /etc/issue`" == "" ]; then
echo "Authorized uses only. All activity may be \
monitored and reported." >> /etc/issue
fi
if [ "`grep -i authorized /etc/motd`" == "" ]; then
echo "Authorized uses only. All activity may be \
monitored and reported." >> /etc/motd
fi
diff issue.net-preCIS issue.net
```

### 1 Create banners for network access:

```
cp -fp /etc/issue /etc/issue.net
if [ "`grep -i authorized /etc/issue.net`" == "" ];
then
echo "Authorized uses only. All activity may be \
monitored and reported." >> /etc/issue.net
fi
```

### 1 Protect banner:

```
chown root:root /etc/motd /etc/issue /etc/issue.net
chmod 644 /etc/motd /etc/issue /etc/issue.net
for FILE in motd issue issue.net; do
printf "/etc/${FILE} \troot.root\t644\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
done
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## **9.2 Create Warnings For GUI-Based Logins**

### **Description:**

These commands set the warning message on xdm, kdm and gdm – that is, all of the X display managers.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

## Remediation:

```
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/Xresources ]; then
cd /etc/X11/xdm
awk '/xlogin*greeting:/ \
{ print "xlogin*greeting: Authorized uses only!";
next };
{ print }' Xresources-preCIS > Xresources
chown root:root Xresources
chmod 644 Xresources
diff Xresources-preCIS Xresources
fi
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc ]; then
cd /etc/X11/xdm
awk '/GreetString=/ \
{ print "GreetString=Authorized uses only!"; next };
{ print }' kdmrc-preCIS > kdmrc
chown root:root kdmrc
chmod 644 kdmrc
printf "/etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc \troot.root\t644\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff kdmrc-preCIS kdmrc
fi
if [ -e /etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf ]; then
cd /etc/X11/gdm
cp -pf gdm.conf gdm.conf.tmp
awk '/^Greeter=/ && /gdmgreeter/ \
{ printf("#%s\n", $0); next };
/^#Greeter=/ && /gdmlogin/ \
{ $1 = "Greeter=gdmlogin" }; /Welcome=/ \
{ print "`"; next };
{ print }' gdm.conf.tmp > gdm.conf
rm -f gdm.conf.tmp
chown root:root gdm.conf
chmod 644 gdm.conf
printf "/etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf \troot.root\t644\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
diff gdm.conf-preCIS gdm.conf
fi
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

### 9.3 Create "authorized only" Banners For vsftpd, If Applicable

#### Description:

This item configures vsftpd "authorized users only" banner messages.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
cd /etc
if [ -e vsftpd.conf ]; then
echo "ftpd_banner=Authorized users only. All activity
\
may be monitored and reported." >> vsftpd.conf
fi
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD



## 10 Anti-Virus Consideration

### 10.1 Anti-Virus Products

#### Description:

Certain systems – such as mail servers and file servers – should have anti-virus software installed to protect the Windows clients that use the server. The following table summarizes the popular anti-virus offerings for the Linux platform. The Center for Internet security makes no endorsement for any product.

Vendor	Product
Sophos <a href="http://www.sophos.com/">http://www.sophos.com/</a>	Commercial
NAI Virus Scan	Commercial
ClamAV <a href="http://www.clamav.net/">http://www.clamav.net/</a>	Open Source
McAfee <a href="http://www.mcafee.com/">http://www.mcafee.com/</a>	Commercial
CyberSoft Vfind <a href="http://www.cyber.com/products/masterprice.html">http://www.cyber.com/products/masterprice.html</a>	
H+B edv (hbedv)	
f-prot Antivirus <a href="http://www.f-prot.com/products/corporate_users/unix/">http://www.f-prot.com/products/corporate_users/unix/</a>	Commercial
Trend Micro	Commercial
Computer Associates InoculateIT <a href="http://www.cai.com/">http://www.cai.com/</a>	Commercial

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 11 Remove Backup Files

### 11.1 Remove Backup Files

**Description:**

```
find / -xdev | grep preCIS | xargs rm -rf
```

When you are certain your changes are successful, remove the backup files as they will have insecure contents and/or permissions/ownerships. By leaving these files on your system, an attacker can use the backup files as if they were the originals thereby defeating much of your efforts.

**Warning: Do not remove backup files until you are certain your changes are successful.**

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 12 Additional Security Notes

### Description:

The items in this section are security configuration settings that have been suggested by several other resources and system hardening tools. However, given the other settings in the benchmark document, the settings presented here provide relatively little incremental security benefit. Nevertheless, none of these settings should have a significant impact on the functionality of the system, and some sites may feel that the slight security enhancement of these settings outweighs the (sometimes minimal) administrative cost of performing them.

None of these settings will be checked by the automated scoring tool provided with the benchmark document. They are purely optional and may be applied or not at the discretion of local site administrators.

### 12.1 Create Symlinks For Dangerous Files

#### Description:

The `/root/.rhosts`, `/root/.shosts`, and `/etc/hosts.equiv` files enable a weak form of access control (see the discussion of `.rhosts` files above). Attackers will often target these files as part of their exploit scripts. By linking these files to `/dev/null`, any data that an attacker writes to these files is simply discarded (though an astute attacker can still remove the link prior to writing their malicious data).

#### Recommendation Level: 1

#### Remediation:

```
for FILE in /root/.rhosts /root/.shosts /etc/hosts.equiv \
/etc/shosts.equiv; do
rm -f $FILE
ln -s /dev/null $FILE
done
```

#### Scoring Status: Not Scorable

#### Compliance Mapping: TBD

#### Audit: TBD

### 12.2 Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection

#### Description:

A "SYN Attack" is a denial of service (DoS) attack that consumes resources on your system forcing you to reboot. This particular attack is performed by beginning the TCP connection handshake (sending the SYN packet), and then never completing the process to open the connection. This leaves your system with several (hundreds or thousands) of half-open connections. This is a fairly simple attack and should be blocked.

#### Recommendation Level: 1

**Remediation:**

```
echo "echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies" \  
>> /etc/init.d/boot.local
```

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 12.3 Additional LILO/GRUB Security

**Description:**

Setting the immutable flag on the LILO and GRUB config files will prevent any changes (accidental or otherwise) to the lilo.conf or menu.lst files. If you wish to modify either file you will need to unset the immutable flag using the chattr command with -i instead of +i.

**Recommendation Level:** 1**Remediation:**

```
chattr +i /etc/lilo.conf
```

```
chattr +i /boot/grub/menu.lst
```

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 12.4 Evaluate Packages Associated With Startup Scripts

**Description:**

**Question:** *How many of the startup script do you really need?*

The most effective way to get rid of the much of the unused software is to look in the startup directory /etc/init.d and evaluate which of these remaining services are not necessary. Use rpm -qf <scriptname> to determine the package it belongs to, use rpm -qi <packagename> to read about it, then use rpm -e <packagename> to remove it. For example, this server may not use Broadcom NIC drivers, and therefore will not need the bcm5820 package. rpm -qf bcm5820 shows us bcm5820 belongs to bcm5820-1.17-6. rpm -qi bcm5820 proves we do not need this package. rpm -e bcm5820 takes care of it.

In some cases, you will not be able to remove a script/package – kdcrotate is a good example: it belongs to package krb5-libs, which is required by several packages, including sendmail and nss\_ldap. In cases like this, you may just want to use chkconfig <scriptname> off to keep it from running.

You should consider configuring iptables to act as a server-level firewall. There is controversy over this technique as some organizations feel all they need is the perimeter firewall and others feel the perimeter is just the first line of defense.

**Recommendation Level: 1**

**Remediation:**

```
cd /etc/init.d  
ls
```

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 12.5 Evaluate Every Installed Package

**Description:**

**Question:** *How much unused software was installed on your system?*

SUSE Linux installation includes many packages that are usually not necessary in an Enterprise server environment (dosfstools, for example). Computer Security Industry Best Practices recommend removing unused services and software to minimize attack vectors on a system. The following references suggest removing unused software:

- Common Sense Guide to Cyber Security for Small Businesses – Recommended Actions for Information Security, 1st Edition, March 2004, [http://www.us-cert.gov/reading\\_room/CSG-small-business.pdf](http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/CSG-small-business.pdf)
- IUP System Administrator Security Guidelines and Best Practices, <http://www.iup.edu/tsc/security/>;
- Security Engineering Awareness for Systems Engineers , <http://www.software.org/pub/externalpapers/SecEngAwareness.doc>.

This task can be performed fairly quickly by logging in twice and running

```
rpm -qa | sort | less
```

in one shell, and then using the other shell to remove the packages. You will find some packages are dependent upon others and you will have to remove several packages at once. In some cases, an unused package will be required by another useful package, and it will have to remain installed – for example, dateconfig may rely upon audiofile. If the features of dateconfig are required, then audiofile will have to remain. One may think that the functionality of dateconfig is not necessary, however, this tool is used to adjust the date, timezone and NTP settings of the server, and some Enterprises will have problems making system changes to servers without using the vendor-recommended tools.

Also note that if the service is disabled, the relevant software should be removed for the following reasons:

- 1 Less software to maintain and monitor for security issues.
- 2 The service cannot be inadvertently enabled by an errant administrator.
- 3 Minimize damage in an attack should the attacker gain (or already have) access to the server.

Removed software can always be reinstalled using the Enterprise procedures.

By using this methodology on a test server, a still functional basic server was produced with less than 230 packages installed (down from the original 350 packages) taking up under 350MB of disk storage. This was performed in under an hour..

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 12.6 Configure sudo

### Description:

sudo is a package that allows the System Administrator to delegate activities to groups of users. These activities are normally beyond the administrative capability of that user – restarting the web server, for example. If frequent web server configuration changes are taking place (or you have a bug and the web server keeps crashing), it becomes very cumbersome to continually engage the SysAdmin just to restart the web server. sudo allows the Administrator to delegate just that one task using root authority without allowing that group of users any other root capability.

Once sudo is installed, configure it using visudo – do not vi the config file. visudo has error checking built in. Experience has shown that if /etc/sudoers gets botched (from using vi without visudo's error checking feature), recovery may become very difficult.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable

**Compliance Mapping:** TBD

**Audit:** TBD

## 12.7 Additional Kernel Tunings

### Description:

Before implementing these changes, please review them with your environment in mind. The above value for tcp\_max\_orphans is much lower than the default 16,384, and may be too low, depending on the server's use and environment.

Also be aware that logging all martians may generate an excessive amount of logs, especially on multi-homed servers with at least one network interface on a hostile network (i.e, your border firewalls). You should ensure you have plenty of log space available as well as sending your logs to a remote logging host.

**Recommendation Level:** 1

**Remediation:**

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# Following 2 lines added by CISecurity Benchmark sec SN.9
net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans = 256
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
printf "/etc/sysctl.conf \troot.root\t600\n" >> \
/etc/permissions.local
```

**Scoring Status:** Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## 12.8 Remove All Compilers and Assemblers

**Description:**

**Question:** *Is there a mission-critical reason to have a compiler or assembler on this machine? If the answer is no, perform the action below.*

C compilers pose a credible threat to production systems and should not be installed. Compilers should be installed on select development systems – those systems that have a Business need for a compiler – and the resulting output binaries deployed onto other development and production systems using the existing Enterprise change processes.

**Recommendation Level:** 1**Remediation:**

Remove the following packages if they exist on your system:

```
gcc gcc3 gcc3-c++ gcc3-g77 gcc3-java gcc3-objc gcc-c++ gcc-chill gcc-g77 gcc-java gcc-objc bin86
dev86 nasm.
```

**Scoring Status:** Not Scorable**Compliance Mapping:** TBD**Audit:** TBD

## Appendix A: File Backup Script

```
#!/bin/bash
# Create /root/do-restore.sh
cat <<EOF > /root/do-restore.sh
#!/bin/bash
# This script restores the files changed by the CISecurity
# Linux Benchmark do-backup.sh script.
unalias rm mv cp
sed -n "31,9999p" /root/do-restore.sh | while read LINE; do
FILE=`echo \ $LINE | awk '{print \$1}'`
PERMS=`echo \ $LINE | awk '{print \$2}'`
echo "Restoring \ $FILE with \ $PERMS permissions"
[ -f \ ${FILE}-preCIS ] && /bin/cp -p \ ${FILE}-preCIS \ ${FILE}
/bin/chmod \ ${PERMS} \ ${FILE}
[ -f \ ${FILE}-preCIS ] && /bin/rm \ ${FILE}-preCIS
done
echo "Completed file restoration - restoring directories"
for DIR in \
/etc/xinetd.d /etc/rc.d \
/var/spool/cron /etc/cron.* \
/etc/pam.d /etc/skel
do
if [ -d \ ${DIR}-preCIS ]; then
echo "Restoring \ ${DIR}"
/bin/cp -pr \ ${DIR}-preCIS \ ${DIR}
/bin/rm -rf \ ${DIR}-preCIS
fi
done
### END OF SCRIPT. DYNAMIC DATA FOLLOWS. ###
EOF
/bin/chmod 700 /root/do-restore.sh
echo "Backing up individual files"
for FILE in \
/etc/ssh/ssh_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/hosts.deny \
/etc/hosts.allow /etc/rc.status \
/etc/inittab /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/syslog.conf /etc/ftpaccess \
/etc/vsftpd.conf /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf /etc/syslog.conf /etc/fstab \
/etc/security/console.perms /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /etc/ftpusers \
/etc/vsftpd.ftpusers /etc/X11/xdm/Xservers /etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf \
/etc/X11/xinit/xserverrc /etc/cron.deny /etc/at.deny /etc/crontab \
/etc/securetty /etc/lilo.conf /etc/grub.conf /etc/exports \
/etc/init.d/syslog /etc/profile /etc/csh.login /etc/csh.cshrc \
/etc/bashrc /root/.bash_profile /root/.bashrc /root/.cshrc \
/root/.tcshrc /etc/security/limits.conf /etc/issue /etc/motd \
/etc/issue.net /etc/X11/xdm/Xresources /etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc \
/etc/sysctl.conf /var/spool/cron/allow /var/spool/cron/deny
/etc/login.defs /etc/bash.bashrc /etc/default/useradd /etc/pam.d/su
/at.allow /etc/permissions.local /etc/postfix/master.cf; do
if [ -f \ ${FILE} ]; then
# Backup file
/bin/cp -p \ ${FILE} \ ${FILE}-preCIS
# Add it to the do-restore script
echo \ ${FILE} `find \ ${FILE} -printf "%m" ` >> /root/do-restore.sh
fi
done
echo "Completed file backups - backing up directories"
for DIR in \
/etc/xinetd.d /etc/init.d \
/var/spool/cron /etc/cron.* \
/etc/pam.d /etc/skel
do
```



```
echo ${DIR}
[ -d ${DIR} ] && /bin/cp -pr ${DIR} ${DIR}-preCIS
done
echo "Recording log permissions"
find /var/log -printf "%h/%f %m\n" >> /root/do-restore.sh
echo "Backup complete."
```

## Appendix B: Change History

- January 3, 2006 – Version 1.0

Original document created

- May, 2008 - Version 2.0 Update

- # When possible, standard /etc/permissions used to ensure correct ownership and permissions
- # Whenever possible, SuSEconfig (/etc/sysconfig) is the preferred method for adjusting configuration.
- # defer explicit permissions to SLES default when possible
- # remediations are now explicitly identified as such
- # questions are now explicitly identified as such
- # warnings are now explicitly identified as such
- # section 1 removed Bastille references
- # section 1 added SuSEfirewall2
- # section 1 added AppArmor
- # section 1 added seccheck
- # 2.1 changed to disable all xinetd.d services (had had an arbitrary list)
- # 2.2 deprecated TCP wrappers in favor of SuSEfirewall2
- # 2.5 corrected to address rexec, rlogin, rsh
- # 3.2 added stop for xinetd and removed remark about reboot
- # 3.3 corrected to use standard sysconfig, leaving postfix active
- # 3.4 remediation changed to be re-doable
- # 3.6 target for removal?
- # 3.7 what about nmb?
- # 3.14 not pertinent - SLES uses CUPS
- # 3.17 text changed, since SUSE does not do named by default, and it is default chroot
- # 3.21 not pertinent
- # 4.1 removed duplicate reference to tcp\_syncookies (left in a later section)
- # section 5 completely redone
- # 7.2 unnecessary
- # 7.4 corrected remediation, added warning
- # 7.5 changed to use chkstat.
- # 7.6 deprecated in favor of SuSEfirewall2
- # 7.7 corrected for syslog-ng
- # Removed references to Bastille (formerly Appendix C)

## References

*The Center for Internet Security*

*Free benchmark documents and security tools for various OS platforms and applications:*

<http://www.cisecurity.org/>

*SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Administration Guide*

*SUSE Linux Enterprise Server User Guide*

*Other Misc Documentation*

*Various documentation on Linux security issues:*

*Primary source for information on NTP*

<http://www.ntp.org/>

*Information on MIT Kerberos:*

<http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/>

*Apache "Security Tips" document:*

[http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/misc/security\\_tips.html](http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/misc/security_tips.html)

*Information on Sendmail and DNS:*

<http://www.sendmail.org/>

<http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/dns-sendmail/DNSandSendmail.pdf>

*OpenSSH (secure encrypted network logins):*

<http://www.openssh.org>

*TCP Wrappers source distribution:*

<ftp://porcupine.org>

*PortSentry and Logcheck (port and log monitoring tools):*

<http://sourceforge.net/projects/sentrytools/>

*Swatch (log monitoring tool):*

<http://www.oit.ucsb.edu/~eta/swatch/>

*Open Source Sendmail (email server) distributions:*

<ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/>

*LPRng (Open Source replacement printing system for Unix):*

<http://www.lprng.org/>

*sudo* (provides fine-grained access controls for superuser activity):

<http://www.courtesan.com/sudo/>

Tripwire – file modification utility

<http://www.tripwire.org>